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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Daniel K. Miller appeals from the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his 42 
                                                 
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.   
 2 
U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Office of Children, Youth and Families of Allegheny 
County (“CYF”), in which he alleged that CYF violated his constitutional rights to 
procedural and substantive due process in connection with proceedings to terminate his 
parental rights.  We will affirm. 
I.1 
 
 Miller is the parent of a minor child who was removed from his custody by CYF 
in September 2010.  CYF gave Miller a “Family Service Plan” to follow in order to 
regain custody of his child; the requirements involved cleaning his residence, attending 
parenting classes, and cooperating with CYF.  Miller contends that he complied with all 
of CYF’s requirements in the Family Service Plan and that his home passed various 
inspections. 
 Several hearings were held regarding the custody status of the child.  In October 
2010, a hearing was held for which Miller alleges he received no notice; it is unclear, 
however, what occurred at this hearing.  Hearings were also held in January, March, and 
June 2011.  In June, a representative of CYF requested that Miller’s visitation be reduced 
and that the court begin the process of terminating Miller’s parental rights and changing 
the goal of the proceedings to adoption.  Miller claims that he was not permitted to 
present evidence of having completed the Family Service Plan at this hearing.  The 
hearing officer granted CYF’s request and Miller’s visitation was reduced.   According to 
                                                 
1 The facts as described herein are drawn from Miller’s Third Amended Complaint (the 
“complaint”), the allegations of which we accept as true for purposes of reviewing his 
claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 
2009).  
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Miller, a review hearing was scheduled for December 6, 2011 to determine whether the 
Family Service Plan had been completed.  He alleges that “[a]t no point was a 
[Termination of Parental Rights] Hearing discussed or mentioned,” and that, at the end of 
the December 6 hearing, the judge ordered another review hearing in three months.  
(App. at 8.)   
 On December 9, 2011, however, Miller’s parental rights were terminated “during 
state court proceedings,” although he contends that “[n]o hearing occurred on that date.”  
(Id.)  Miller alleges that he received no notice of this hearing, and claims that CYF acted 
with intent to prevent him from testifying and denied him an opportunity to be heard.  
According to Miller, he had visitation with his child on December 6 and 13, 2011, at 
which there was no mention of his rights being terminated, and was only notified of the 
termination on December 19, 2011, when he called to set up a visit.   
 In March 2013, Miller filed this § 1983 action against CYF, alleging violation of 
his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due 
process.  On October 17, 2013, the District Court granted CYF’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Court concluded 
that there was “no evidence” that Miller was deprived of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard because he admitted, in the complaint, that no hearing occurred on December 9 and 
that he attended a hearing on December 6, and because court records indicated that he 
was served with copies of a Petition to Involuntarily Terminate Parental Rights and a 
Notice of Hearing on the matter for December 6, 2011.  Miller v. Office of Children, 
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Youth, and Families of Allegheny Cnty., No. 13-cv-00315, 2013 WL 5674461, at *4 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2013).  The Court also held that Miller’s substantive due process 
claim failed because he had not alleged facts “tending to show at least gross negligence 
or arbitrariness,” and that both claims failed for the additional reason that he failed to 
allege adequate facts to support a claim of municipal liability.  Id. at *5.  Finally, the 
Court held that it need not reach the issue of whether an agency such as CYF “is not a 
distinct entity subject to suit under § 1983,” as CYF had contended.  Id. at *5 n.3.  This 
appeal followed.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 260 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  Our review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary.  
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 206.  We “accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,” in 
determining “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the 
plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 210-11 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).   
III. 
 To state a claim for violation of procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is 
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or 
property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’”  
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Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. 
Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2001)).  We have recognized that natural parents have 
a fundamental liberty interest in the “care, custody, and management of their child,” a 
protected interest under both the procedural and substantive due process components of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).  As the Supreme Court has 
held, the “fundamental requirement” of procedural due process is “the opportunity to be 
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).  With respect to substantive due 
process, “a child welfare agency abridges an individual’s substantive due process rights 
when its actions exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a level of 
gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed shocks the conscience.”  Mulholland v. 
Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 “[T]o establish municipal liability under § 1983, [Miller] must show that [he was] 
deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, and 
that the deprivation of those rights was the result of an official government policy or 
custom.”  Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  A policy is “a decision of a municipality’s duly 
constituted legislative body or of officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the 
municipality,” while a custom is “a practice that, although not . . .  formally approved by 
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an appropriate decisionmaker . . . is so widespread as to have the force of law.”  B.S., 704 
F.3d at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In this case, the District Court properly dismissed Miller’s complaint in its entirety 
because he failed to allege that the deprivation of his rights resulted from any official 
policy or custom of CYF, the only defendant.  See, e.g., Mulholland, 706 F.3d at 239 
(holding that even if a county agency’s child abuse investigation was inadequate, the 
parents’ § 1983 claim failed where there was no evidence that the agency “employ[ed] a 
policy or ha[d] a custom of conducting desultory investigations”).   There are simply no 
allegations in the complaint to support a finding that Miller failed to receive due process 
of law or that his parental rights were terminated as a result of a policy or custom of 
CYF.2   
 In light of the lack of adequate allegations to support a claim of municipal 
liability, we need not address whether Miller’s allegations were otherwise adequate to 
state a procedural or substantive due process claim.  Were we to reach this question, 
however, we might well take issue with the District Court’s reliance on a document 
outside the pleadings which, although a public record, did not “form[] part of the basis 
for [Miller’s] claim,” nor could it be considered “undisputedly authentic,” as the Court 
                                                 
2 Analyzing CYF’s liability under Monell and its progeny is appropriate in light of  
CYF’s acknowledgement that it constitutes a sub-unit of Allegheny County (see 
Appellee’s Br. at 22), and the allegations of Miller’s complaint, in which he contends that 
CYF is a “local government entity.” (App. at 3).  See, e.g., B.S., 704 F.3d at 254 n.5 
(treating the liability of Somerset County Children and Youth Services as “coextensive” 
with the liability of Somerset County, where those parties acknowledged that the agency 
acted on behalf of the county with respect to child protective services).   
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suggested.  See Miller, 2013 WL 5674461, at *4 n.2.  Although not relevant to our 
ultimate disposition of this appeal, we note that the document, an Affidavit of Service 
purporting to establish that Miller received notice of a December 6, 2011 hearing, 
constituted “extraneous evidence submitted by the defense” that was subject to potential 
challenge by Miller and not proper for consideration on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  See 
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court erred 
in considering documents not “integral to the complaint,” including affidavits, when 
ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 Finally, while CYF contends that, as a sub-unit of Allegheny County, it is not 
subject to suit under § 1983, the District Court did not analyze this issue and we, 
likewise, need not address it.   
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
